Lessons in financial economics from Seinfeld

Authored by

Owen A. Lamont, Ph.D.

Senior Vice President, Portfolio Manager, Research

Seinfeld (1989-1998) described itself as “a show about nothing.” But actually, it’s a show about financial economics. Seinfeld illuminates many important ideas about behavioral economics and market structure.

1) Storage is not free

In “The Soup,” Kramer gets rid of his fridge in an effort to eat only fresh foods. Predictably, he ends up constantly stealing food from Jerry’s fridge. Kramer has discovered storage costs.

This episode, which aired in 1994, anticipated an astounding development twenty years later: the appearance of negative nominal interest rates in Europe and Japan. Many finance professors, including me, had previously taught that negative rates were impossible because savers could always simply own physical currency, which has a zero interest rate, rather than buy a bond with a negative yield.

Like Kramer, we forgot that storage has costs. If you try to physically store euros, the notes may be stolen or lost or eaten by rats as happened in Greece in 2011.[1] Storage costs for paper currency are a major problem for drug dealers, such as Pablo Escobar:[2]

Despite his best efforts, however, even Escobar couldn’t spend all that money, and much of it was stored in warehouses and fields. According to his brother, about 10%, or $2.1 billion, was written off annually—eaten by rats or destroyed by the elements.

The 10% estimated loss rate provides an empirical basis for what I call the rodent-based theory of monetary policy. Instead of a ZLB (zero lower bound) for interest rates, we have a RLB (rodent lower bound) of -10%. Rates set by rats.

2) Anti-skill is valuable

In “The Opposite,” George has an epiphany:

every decision I've ever made in my entire life has been wrong. My life is the complete opposite of everything I want it to be. Every instinct I have in every aspect of life, be it something to wear, something to eat…it’s all been wrong.

Jerry makes an excellent observation:

If every instinct you have is wrong, then the opposite would have to be right.

George has anti-skill: the ability to make not just random decisions but to make bad decisions. In this respect, George is a typical retail investor. Frazzini and Lamont (2008) make an observation similar to Jerry’s:

Our main result is that on average, retail investors direct their money to funds which invest in stocks that have low future returns. To achieve high returns, it is best to do the opposite of these investors.

More broadly, Barber and Odean (2013) review a large body of evidence suggesting that retail investors have anti-skill (they call it “perverse stock selection ability”) as in the previously mentioned evidence from Taiwan.

My advice to you is: find the George Costanza in your life, and listen carefully to his advice. Ask him which stocks to buy, which job to take, and where to live. Then do the opposite. If you are university faculty, identify the Professor Costanza among your colleagues. However he votes at a faculty meeting, you should vote the opposite way.

3) Risk management is misunderstood

In “The Fatigues,” George is forced to give a lecture on risk management to a group of executives. But instead of lecture notes, George has accidentally brought Jerry’s monologue about Ovaltine. George reads the jokes aloud in a flat tone. Amazingly, his performance is a hit with his boss, Mr. Wilhelm, who is unable to distinguish between risk management and Ovaltine.

4) Agency costs are real

In “The Chicken Roaster,” Elaine is temporarily in charge of the J. Peterman company. She abuses her expense account and buys George a sable fur hat. This behavior would be no surprise to Adam Smith, who wrote in The Wealth of Nations that:

… being the managers rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master's honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.

George quickly loses the expensive hat. Negligence and profusion, indeed.

5) Investing is a social activity

In “The Stock Tip,” George learns from a friend about Centrax, a company with an exciting new technology to televise opera.[3] George convinces Jerry to buy Centrax shares. Here we see another way in which George is a typical retail investor: influenced by friends and transmitting investment narratives to others. At the end of the episode, George expresses interest in another stock which is some sort of “robot butcher,” perhaps foreshadowing today’s AI-driven market.

The social aspect of stock market investing has been a major theme in academic finance for the past forty years, starting with Shiller (1984):

Investing in speculative assets is a social activity. Investors spend a substantial part of their leisure time discussing investments, reading about investments, or gossiping about others' successes or failures in investing.

These social dynamics imply that investment ideas are like infections that spread throughout the population by person-to-person contact. Here’s Shiller (2017) discussing this process as an explanation for bubbles:

In a bubble, the contagion is altered by the public attention to price increases: rapid price increases boost the contagion rate of popular stories justifying that increase, heightening demand and more price increases. In a stock market bubble, these might be stories of the companies with glamorous new technology and of the people who created the technology.

Shiller was writing in April 2017. Demonstrating his uncanny gift for prediction, he also discusses contagion, the economic impact of the 1920 influenza epidemic, and the SIR model of disease. These were all subjects that I didn’t consider until March 2020 when COVID swept over the world. If Shiller ever mentions Noah’s flood, I suggest that you buy a life raft immediately.

6) Social dynamics are unpredictable

In “The Pledge Drive,” Elaine witnesses her boss eating a Snickers bar with a fork and knife. She tells George about this odd behavior. George thinks it’s classy and repeats this behavior in the presence of work colleagues. Soon everyone in New York City is eating candy with silverware.

Economists would call this process “herding,” an “informational cascade,” a “bandwagon effect,” or “social learning.” As described by “Turkey Dave” in Hirshleifer (2020), the field of social economics is concerned with these dynamics, involving bubbles, crashes, and waves of seemingly arbitrary behavior. These dynamics may reflect rational individuals who are seemingly irrational at the aggregate level, as described in Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003):

(1) frequent convergence by individuals or firms upon mistaken actions based up on little investigation and little justifying information; (2) the tendency for social outcomes to be fragile with respect to seemingly small shocks; and (3) the tendency for individuals or firms to delay decision for extended periods of time and then, without obvious external trigger, suddenly rush to act simultaneously.

Not all incipient bubbles actually bubble. Sometimes, they fizzle out. In “The Puffy Shirt,” Jerry tries to start a trend for puffy shirts, but it backfires.

7) Yada yada yada

In “Yada yada yada,” George’s girlfriend uses the term “yada yada yada” as a way of succinctly telling stories while eliding over embarrassing details. For example, “my ex-boyfriend came over last night, yada yada yada, today I’m really tired.”

Yada yada yada is the ultimate answer to the most basic question about crypto: what is the use case for cryptocurrency? The answer: yada yada yada. As in “crypto is a revolutionary new financial technology, yada yada yada, therefore you should buy bitcoin.”

8) Narratives matter

In “The Van Buren Boys,” Elaine is ghost-writing J. Peterman’s memoirs. Kramer sells them his entire corpus of anecdotes, but Elaine feels the stories are not good enough. Jerry suggests that she can re-write them:

Well, just shape them, change them. You're a writer…Make them interesting.

This gives Elaine an insight:

Interesting! Of course! People love interesting!

Elaine is correct. People do love interesting. And it doesn’t take a professional writer to implement Jerry’s suggestion that the story can be “shaped,” because that process happens naturally through anonymous social sharing and repetition. Here’s Hirshleifer (2020):

 … information is systematically distorted in a process of leveling and sharpening. Subjects emphasize the perceived essence of a story by selectively retaining details consistent with it, intensifying details, increasing magnitudes, and adding compatible new details and explanations. As a result, rumors can become inaccurate and extreme.

Shiller (2017) explores the ideas of narratives:

I use the term narrative to mean a simple story or easily expressed explanation of events that many people want to bring up in conversation or on news or social media because it can be used to stimulate the concerns or emotions of others, and/or because it appears to advance self-interest. To be stimulating, it usually has some human interest either direct or implied. As I (and many others) use the term, a narrative is a gem for conversation, and may take the form of an extraordinary or heroic tale or even a joke. It is not generally a researched story, and may have glaring holes, as in “urban legends.” The form of the narrative varies through time and across tellings, but maintains a core contagious element, in the forms that are successful in spreading. Why an element is contagious, when it may even “go viral,” may be hard to understand, unless we reflect carefully on the reason people like to spread the narrative.

Kramer’s best anecdote is about attempting to take the subway in order to return pants to the store. Somehow, the story is compelling, and has a core contagious element. Similarly, the story that “AI will transform the economy, and you should therefore invest in technology stocks” has a contagious appeal.

Kramer’s pants come to a tragic end. Kramer slips and falls in the mud, thus ruining the very pants he was planning to return. Let us hope the AI narrative has a happier ending.



Endnotes

[1]Greece in panic as it faces change of Homeric proportions,” The Guardian, August 1, 2011.

[2] Tikkanen, Amy. "Pablo Escobar: 8 Interesting Facts About the King of Cocaine". Encyclopedia Britannica, 30 Nov. 2023.

[3] Centrax is a fictional security. References to Centrax should not be interpreted as recommendations to buy or sell specific fictional securities.

References

Barber, B.M., Lee, Y.T., Liu, Y.J. and Odean, T., 2009. Just how much do individual investors lose by trading?. The Review of Financial Studies22(2), pp.609-632.

Barber, Brad M., and Terrance Odean. "The behavior of individual investors." In Handbook of the Economics of Finance, vol. 2, pp. 1533-1570. Elsevier, 2013.

Frazzini, Andrea, and Owen A. Lamont. "Dumb money: Mutual fund flows and the cross-section of stock returns." Journal of Financial Economics 88, no. 2 (2008): 299-322.

Hirshleifer, David. "Presidential address: Social transmission bias in economics and finance." The Journal of Finance 75, no. 4 (2020): 1779-1831.

Hirshleifer, David, and Siew Hong Teoh. "Herd behaviour and cascading in capital markets: A review and synthesis." European Financial Management 9, no. 1 (2003): 25-66.

Shiller, Robert J. "Stock prices and social dynamics." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1984, no. 2 (1984): 457-510.

Shiller, Robert J. "Narrative economics." American Economic Review 107, no. 4 (2017): 967-1004.

Legal Disclaimer

These materials provided herein may contain material, non-public information within the meaning of the United States Federal Securities Laws with respect to Acadian Asset Management LLC, BrightSphere Investment Group Inc. and/or their respective subsidiaries and affiliated entities. The recipient of these materials agrees that it will not use any confidential information that may be contained herein to execute or recommend transactions in securities. The recipient further acknowledges that it is aware that United States Federal and State securities laws prohibit any person or entity who has material, non-public information about a publicly-traded company from purchasing or selling securities of such company, or from communicating such information to any other person or entity under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such person or entity is likely to sell or purchase such securities.

Acadian provides this material as a general overview of the firm, our processes and our investment capabilities. It has been provided for informational purposes only. It does not constitute or form part of any offer to issue or sell, or any solicitation of any offer to subscribe or to purchase, shares, units or other interests in investments that may be referred to herein and must not be construed as investment or financial product advice. Acadian has not considered any reader's financial situation, objective or needs in providing the relevant information.

The value of investments may fall as well as rise and you may not get back your original investment. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance or returns. Acadian has taken all reasonable care to ensure that the information contained in this material is accurate at the time of its distribution, no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to the accuracy, reliability or completeness of such information.

This material contains privileged and confidential information and is intended only for the recipient/s. Any distribution, reproduction or other use of this presentation by recipients is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient and this presentation has been sent or passed on to you in error, please contact us immediately. Confidentiality and privilege are not lost by this presentation having been sent or passed on to you in error.

Acadian’s quantitative investment process is supported by extensive proprietary computer code. Acadian’s researchers, software developers, and IT teams follow a structured design, development, testing, change control, and review processes during the development of its systems and the implementation within our investment process. These controls and their effectiveness are subject to regular internal reviews, at least annual independent review by our SOC1 auditor. However, despite these extensive controls it is possible that errors may occur in coding and within the investment process, as is the case with any complex software or data-driven model, and no guarantee or warranty can be provided that any quantitative investment model is completely free of errors. Any such errors could have a negative impact on investment results. We have in place control systems and processes which are intended to identify in a timely manner any such errors which would have a material impact on the investment process.

Acadian Asset Management LLC has wholly owned affiliates located in London, Singapore, and Sydney. Pursuant to the terms of service level agreements with each affiliate, employees of Acadian Asset Management LLC may provide certain services on behalf of each affiliate and employees of each affiliate may provide certain administrative services, including marketing and client service, on behalf of Acadian Asset Management LLC.

Acadian Asset Management LLC is registered as an investment adviser with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Registration of an investment adviser does not imply any level of skill or training.

Acadian Asset Management (Singapore) Pte Ltd, (Registration Number: 199902125D) is licensed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. It is also registered as an investment adviser with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Acadian Asset Management (Australia) Limited (ABN 41 114 200 127) is the holder of Australian financial services license number 291872 ("AFSL"). It is also registered as an investment adviser with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Under the terms of its AFSL, Acadian Asset Management (Australia) Limited is limited to providing the financial services under its license to wholesale clients only. This marketing material is not to be provided to retail clients.

Acadian Asset Management (UK) Limited is authorized and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority ('the FCA') and is a limited liability company incorporated in England and Wales with company number 05644066. Acadian Asset Management (UK) Limited will only make this material available to Professional Clients and Eligible Counterparties as defined by the FCA under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, or to Qualified Investors in Switzerland as defined in the Collective Investment Schemes Act, as applicable.

About the Author

Owen Lamont Acadian Asset Management

Owen A. Lamont, Ph.D.

Senior Vice President, Portfolio Manager, Research
Owen joined the Acadian investment team in 2023. In addition to more than 20 years of experience in asset management as a researcher and portfolio manager, Owen has been a member of the faculty at Harvard University, Princeton University, The University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, and Yale School of Management. His professional and academic focus is behavioral finance, and he has published papers on short selling, stock returns, and investor behavior in leading academic journals, and he has testified before the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. Owen earned a Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a B.A. in economics and government from Oberlin College.