Stock splits and stupidity

Authored by

Owen A. Lamont, Ph.D.

Senior Vice President, Portfolio Manager, Research

Stock splits are back in style. Nvidia, Chipotle, and Broadcom all recently announced splits.[1] How should we think about splits? In this post, I’d like to focus on how not to think about them.

In a perfect world populated by rational investors with frictionless trading, there’d be no need for us to think about splits at all, because no one would ever look at nominal share prices. Instead, we’d look at cumulative total return indices for each security, which would have the added benefit of reducing confusion about dividends, as argued by Hartzmark and Solomon (2022).

Unfortunately, we don’t live in a perfect world. Instead, we live in a world of investors with varying cognitive abilities who focus on nominal share prices. Today, I want to discuss research suggesting that splits have real consequences for investors and for market values.

Before going any further, I need to ask you the following three questions:

  1. John has a nickel in his left pocket. He takes the nickel out of his left pocket and puts it in his right pocket. How many cents does John have?
  2. Sally has a nickel. She trades it for five pennies. How many cents does Sally have?
  3. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How many cents does the ball cost?

If you failed to answer “five cents” to all three questions, then understanding splits may be difficult for you, and perhaps a career in finance is not your best fit.

The first two questions are my attempt to capture “conservation.” In child psychology, conservation is the idea that altering the appearance of an object does not change its basic properties. For example, if you cut a cookie in half, you don’t increase the total amount of cookie.

Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget studied the ability of children to understand conservation, and found that by age 11, children had mastered the logic. Evidently, Piaget failed to study CEOs. Thus, it falls to me to announce the winner of the coveted Jean Piaget Award for Financial Innumeracy. The award goes to Park Soon-jae, CEO of Alteogen:[2]

Alteogen, a Korean developer of biobetters, Tuesday said it has decided to gift 0.2 bonus shares for every one common share to shareholders to compensate for the plunge in stock prices from short selling.

“We feel apologetic to the shareholders who have suffered great damage from the drop in the stock price due to short sales,” said Alteogen’s CEO Park Soon-jae denying any changes in the company’s fundamentals

As background information, “free bonus shares” in Korea are the same as “stock dividends” in the U.S. The statement above is describing a 1.2-for-1 split for shareholders of Alteogen.

Consider this hypothetical scenario. You own a restaurant, and you hire a manager to run the restaurant, call him Fred. Fred comes to you and says, “I feel apologetic that you have suffered great damage from the drop in profits due to the hobgoblins that live in the floorboards. Here, as compensation, let me gift you all the cash in the cash register.”

In this scenario, Fred is completely clueless because:

  1. There are no hobgoblins in the floorboards.
  2. Fred does not own the cash in the cash register, and thus he cannot “gift” it to anyone.
  3. You already own the restaurant including the cash in the cash register. How are you made better off by getting something you already own?

Moving now from CEOs to investors, let me describe another cognitive error involving splits. You could describe this error as “nominal illusion,” “money illusion,” or “non-proportional thinking,” but I will just call it “confusion.” It is best illustrated with another hypothetical scenario. Suppose every week you go to the grocery store, where they sell milk in one-gallon containers for $6. One day you arrive at the store, but now you find half-gallon containers that cost $3. Is the milk now “cheaper” and thus a better bargain?

Apparently, for many stock investors, the answer is yes. They view lower priced stocks as more attractive because these stocks have more “room to grow” (Birru and Wang (2016)). A variety of evidence suggests that lower stock prices attract retail investors, and their increased buying is one explanation for the fact that when company ABC announces a stock split, the price of ABC goes up.

Consider a world dominated by confused investors. Suppose a stock is trading at $50 and then does a 2-for-1 split. In a world with only rational investors, the stock price would fall to $25. But $25 would be an irresistible bargain for cognitively challenged investors, and they buy. As a result, when the split takes place, the price does not fall all the way to $25 but instead goes to $26. In this world, a stock split causes the total value of the firm to rise by 4%.

Another way to describe this behavior is that investors are “anchoring” on the previous price level, or are “under-reacting” to the stock split, treating it like a 1.9-to-1 split instead of a 2-for-1 split.

Now, I know this behavior seems implausibly stupid. But if there’s one thing I’ve learned, it is that there does not exist behavior so stupid that it cannot possibly be observed in the wild. I call this the Postulate of Infinite Stupidity: there is no such thing as implausibly stupid.

Is there evidence in favor of the confusion hypothesis? Yes. Duffy, Rabanal, and Rud (2023) conduct a laboratory experiment involving an artificial stock market with splits. They find that when a stock has a 2-for-1 split, the total market value goes up due to buying by confused investors. In fairness to these experimental subjects, we don’t really need to invoke the Postulate of Infinite Stupidity to explain their behavior. It is understandable that when you perform an unfamiliar task involving abstract math for the first time, you might screw up.

And that brings me to question (3) about the cost of the ball and the bat, which comes from the cognitive reflection test of Frederick (2005). Duffy, Rabanal, and Rud (2023) administer a similar test to their experimental subjects and find that people who score poorly on the test are more likely to buy in response to a split. Thus, we have hard evidence that, at least in the lab, the stock price reaction to splits is driven by cognitively challenged buyers. If you do a stock split, you’ll attract some low IQ buyers.

Moving now to the real world, Shue and Townsend (2021) study another implication of non-proportional thinking. Their idea is that investors focus inappropriately on share price levels when processing information. Investors conceptualize news in dollar per share terms instead of percent terms. For example, investors frame “good earnings news” as “stock price should rise $1.” The implication is that low-priced stocks react more to news and thus are more volatile. Here is what they find:

We find a sharp discontinuity around stock splits: total return volatility, idiosyncratic volatility, and market beta increase immediately by approximately 30% after a 2-for-1 split. Further, the volatility does not return to pre-split levels, even after six months.

Now, I am not trying to argue that stock splits are a bad idea. There are many costs and benefits of stock splits, and investor confusion is only one part of the story. It’s also worth noting that the Shue and Townsend (2021) results do not necessarily have normative implications. For example, their findings suggest that the volatility of Nvidia will go up, due to its recent stock split. Is that a bad thing? I don’t know; perhaps Nvidia had artificially low volatility before, and thanks to the split its volatility has now reached appropriate levels.

One thing is for sure. Many market participants get confused by simple corporate events and struggle with basic math. If they can’t handle splits, what else are they getting wrong?

 


You can now subscribe to Owenomics!

Endnotes

[1] References to this and other companies should not be interpreted as recommendations to buy or sell specific securities. Acadian and/or the author of this post may hold positions in one or more securities associated with these companies.”

[2]Alteogen to issue bonus shares to compensate for losses from dubious short sale,” Pulse, October 11, 2022.

References

Birru, Justin, and Baolian Wang. "Nominal price illusion." Journal of Financial Economics 119, no. 3 (2016): 578-598.

Duffy, John, Jean Paul Rabanal, and Olga A. Rud. "Market reactions to stock splits: Experimental evidence." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 214 (2023): 325-345.

Frederick, Shane. "Cognitive reflection and decision making." Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 4 (2005): 25-42.

Hartzmark, Samuel M., and David H. Solomon. "Reconsidering returns." The Review of Financial Studies 35, no. 1 (2022): 343-393.

Shue, Kelly, and Richard R. Townsend. "Can the market multiply and divide? Non‐proportional thinking in financial markets." The Journal of Finance 76, no. 5 (2021): 2307-2357.

Legal Disclaimer

These materials provided herein may contain material, non-public information within the meaning of the United States Federal Securities Laws with respect to Acadian Asset Management LLC, BrightSphere Investment Group Inc. and/or their respective subsidiaries and affiliated entities. The recipient of these materials agrees that it will not use any confidential information that may be contained herein to execute or recommend transactions in securities. The recipient further acknowledges that it is aware that United States Federal and State securities laws prohibit any person or entity who has material, non-public information about a publicly-traded company from purchasing or selling securities of such company, or from communicating such information to any other person or entity under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such person or entity is likely to sell or purchase such securities.

Acadian provides this material as a general overview of the firm, our processes and our investment capabilities. It has been provided for informational purposes only. It does not constitute or form part of any offer to issue or sell, or any solicitation of any offer to subscribe or to purchase, shares, units or other interests in investments that may be referred to herein and must not be construed as investment or financial product advice. Acadian has not considered any reader's financial situation, objective or needs in providing the relevant information.

The value of investments may fall as well as rise and you may not get back your original investment. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance or returns. Acadian has taken all reasonable care to ensure that the information contained in this material is accurate at the time of its distribution, no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to the accuracy, reliability or completeness of such information.

This material contains privileged and confidential information and is intended only for the recipient/s. Any distribution, reproduction or other use of this presentation by recipients is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient and this presentation has been sent or passed on to you in error, please contact us immediately. Confidentiality and privilege are not lost by this presentation having been sent or passed on to you in error.

Acadian’s quantitative investment process is supported by extensive proprietary computer code. Acadian’s researchers, software developers, and IT teams follow a structured design, development, testing, change control, and review processes during the development of its systems and the implementation within our investment process. These controls and their effectiveness are subject to regular internal reviews, at least annual independent review by our SOC1 auditor. However, despite these extensive controls it is possible that errors may occur in coding and within the investment process, as is the case with any complex software or data-driven model, and no guarantee or warranty can be provided that any quantitative investment model is completely free of errors. Any such errors could have a negative impact on investment results. We have in place control systems and processes which are intended to identify in a timely manner any such errors which would have a material impact on the investment process.

Acadian Asset Management LLC has wholly owned affiliates located in London, Singapore, and Sydney. Pursuant to the terms of service level agreements with each affiliate, employees of Acadian Asset Management LLC may provide certain services on behalf of each affiliate and employees of each affiliate may provide certain administrative services, including marketing and client service, on behalf of Acadian Asset Management LLC.

Acadian Asset Management LLC is registered as an investment adviser with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Registration of an investment adviser does not imply any level of skill or training.

Acadian Asset Management (Singapore) Pte Ltd, (Registration Number: 199902125D) is licensed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. It is also registered as an investment adviser with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Acadian Asset Management (Australia) Limited (ABN 41 114 200 127) is the holder of Australian financial services license number 291872 ("AFSL"). It is also registered as an investment adviser with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Under the terms of its AFSL, Acadian Asset Management (Australia) Limited is limited to providing the financial services under its license to wholesale clients only. This marketing material is not to be provided to retail clients.

Acadian Asset Management (UK) Limited is authorized and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority ('the FCA') and is a limited liability company incorporated in England and Wales with company number 05644066. Acadian Asset Management (UK) Limited will only make this material available to Professional Clients and Eligible Counterparties as defined by the FCA under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, or to Qualified Investors in Switzerland as defined in the Collective Investment Schemes Act, as applicable.

About the Author

Owen Lamont Acadian Asset Management

Owen A. Lamont, Ph.D.

Senior Vice President, Portfolio Manager, Research
Owen joined the Acadian investment team in 2023. In addition to more than 20 years of experience in asset management as a researcher and portfolio manager, Owen has been a member of the faculty at Harvard University, Princeton University, The University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, and Yale School of Management. His professional and academic focus is behavioral finance, and he has published papers on short selling, stock returns, and investor behavior in leading academic journals, and he has testified before the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. Owen earned a Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a B.A. in economics and government from Oberlin College.